Cryptography: Authentication

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Alcune possibili minacce di una comunicazione dati

- Violazione confidenzialità
  - **accesso ai contenuti dei messaggi da parte di persone o processi non autorizzati**
  - **analisi del traffico**
    - individuazione di schemi di traffico in base a frequenza e durata della conversazione, diensione dei messaggi, etc.
- Tampering
  - **modifica dei contenuti**
    - alterazione dei contenuti dei messaggi (inserimento, cancellazione, modifica)
- Spoofing
  - **falsificazione del mittente**
    - inserimento di messaggi provenienti da una sorgente fasulla
- Replay/Reflection
  - **ritardo o ripetizione dei messaggi**
  - **modifica della sequenza dei messaggi**
  - **modifica del destinatario dei messaggi**
- Repudiation
  - **Ripudio dell'origine**
    - l'origine nega di aver inviato un messaggio
  - **Ripudio della destinazione**
    - la destinazione nega di aver ricevuto un messaggio

Alcune contromisure

- La prima minaccia riguarda la segretezza dei messaggi
  - **crittografia, mascheramento del traffico**
- La seconda minaccia riguarda l'integrità dei messaggi
  - **Message Integrity Check (MIC)**
- Le altre minacce riguardano in modo diverso l'autenticità dei messaggi, dell'origine, o della destinazione
  - **MIC, Message Authentication Code (MAC), firma digitale**

Message authentication

(data origin authentication, integrity check)

Message Authentication

- Message authentication is concerned with:
  - **protecting the integrity of a message**
  - **validating identity of originator**
  - **non-repudiation of origin (dispute resolution)**

- Three alternative functions used:
  - **secret or public key encryption algorithms**
  - **secret + hash functions**
  - **secret + ad-hoc Message Authentication Code (MAC) functions**

Message Encryption (secret-key)

- If secret-key (symmetric) encryption is used:
  - **encryption provides both privacy and origin authentication**
  - **however, need to recognize corrupted messages (MIC)**

Symmetric encryption: confidentiality and origin authentication



Message Encryption (secret-key)

External error control (checksum): does not securely protect the integrity



Message Integrity Check (MIC): example through internal error control



Message Encryption (public-key)

- if public-key encryption is used
  - **encryption with public key provides no proof/authentication of sender**
    - since anyone potentially knows public-key
  - **both secrecy and authentication if**
    - sender "signs" message using their private-key
    - then encrypts with recipients public key
  - **problems**
    - the result is the same
    - cost of two public-key encryption
    - need to recognize corrupted messages for integrity check

Message Encryption (public-key)

Public-key encryption: confidentiality



Public-key encryption: authentication/signature



Public-key encryption: confidentiality + authentication/signature



Message Authentication Code (MAC)



(a) Message authentication

Message Authentication Code (MAC)

- a MAC is a cryptographic checksum, generated by an algorithm that creates a small fixed-sized block
  - **depending on both message and a secret key K**
    - MAC = $C_K(M)$
  - **condenses a variable-length message M to a fixed-sized authenticator**
    - it need not be reversible
    - is a many-to-one function
      - potentially many messages have same MAC
      - but finding these needs to be very difficult
- appended to message as a **signature**
- receiver performs same computation on message and checks it matches the MAC
- provides assurance that message is unaltered and comes from sender

Message Authentication Code (cont.)

- In case can secrecy is also use required
  - **use of encryption with separate key**
  - **can compute MAC either before or after encryption**
  - **is generally regarded as better done before**
- why use a MAC?
  - **sometimes only authentication is needed**
  - **sometimes need authentication to persist longer than the encryption (eg. archival use)**
- MAC is similar but not equal to digital signature

Requirements for MACs

- MAC functions to satisfy the following requirements:
  - **knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible to find another message with same MAC**
  - **MACs should be uniformly distributed**
  - **MAC should depend equally on all bits of the message**

Using Symmetric Ciphers for MACs

- Can use any block cipher chaining mode and use final block as a MAC
- Data Authentication Algorithm (DAA) is a widely used MAC based on DES-CBC
  - **using IV=0 and zero-pad of final block**
  - **encrypt message using DES in CBC mode**
  - **and send just the final block as the MAC**
    - or the leftmost M bits of final block
- But final MAC is now too small for security (≤64bit)

MAC Security

- **cryptanalytic attacks**
  - **like block ciphers, brute-force attacks are the best alternative**

Hash Message Authenication Code (H-MAC)

- H-MAC (RFC2104)
  è l'applicazione di una funzione di hash in combinazione con una chiave segreta: solo chi possiede la chiave può generare l'hash



HMAC

- Specified as Internet standard RFC2104
- Uses hash function on the message:

$HMAC_K$ = Hash[(K+ XOR opad) || Hash[(K+ XOR ipad)|| M)]]

where K+ is the key padded out to size
and opad, ipad are specified padding constants

- Overhead is just 3 more hash calculations than the message needs alone
- Any of MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160 can be used

HMAC



Peer entity authentication

Autenticazione

- User to host
  - verifica dell'identità di utente che accede ad una risorsa/computer…
- Host to host
  - …si occupa della verifica dell'identità dei sistemi di computer…
- User to user
  - …si dà prova dell'identità di un utente ad un altro utente…
- Identificazione personale

Secrets-based Authentication

- Secrets-based Authentication
  - **"Its not who you are. It's what you know"**
- Basic system uses passwords
  - **Can be easily intercepted**
- Password protection
  - **encrypt/hash the password**
    - The encrypted/hashed form can still be intercepted
  - **modify the encryption/hashing so the encrypted/hashed value changes each time (challenge/response mechanism, one-time password, etc)**

Password-based authentication

- Main problem: eavesdropping



- On-line password guessing
  - **direct password search**
    defense/trick:
    - maximum number of attempts
    - slow down
- Off-line password guessing
  - **the intruder captures a quantity derived by a passwd**
    - e.g. a challenge response, or a hash within a database
  - **off-line passwd search with arbitrary amount of power**
  - **sometimes referred as dictionary attack**

Password security

- Do not send in clear except over short secure channels
- Choose good passwords
- Force changing passwords periodically
- Avoid keeping password in memory longer than necessary to generate the user's master key (KDC)
- Send hash of (key+nonce) for authentication
  (against replay attacks)
- Add salt before hashing passwords for pw database
  (against reflection attacks)
- Add realm name to password before hashing for pw db
  (against reflection attacks)

Storing passwords

- Several possibilities:
  - **user passwd individually stored into each host**
  - **host retrieve the passwd from one location (authentication storage node)**
  - **host send user's information to a authentication facilitator node (Authentication Server) that performs authentication and tells the response (e.g. yes/no)**
    - *"Putt all your eggs in one basket,and then watch that basket very carefully."*
- Last two cases require a security association between the host and the authentication node
- Passwords can be stored
  - **encrypted**
  - **hashed**

Password and Cryptographic keys

- Converting (string) password into cryptographic keys
  - **e.g. DES secret key obtained as hash of the passwd**
- Sometimes, conversion can be more tricky (and computationally expensive)
  - **due to key properties**
  - **e.g. RSA private keys**

Authentication attacks

- There are many variations of authentication protocols but it 's very hard to get right
- Possible authentication attacks are:
  - **Impersonation attacks (pretend to be client or server)**
  - **Reflection attacks (re-send the authentication messages elsewhere)**
  - **Replay attacks (a valid message is copied and later resent)**
  - **Steal client/server authentication database**
  - **Modify messages between client and server**

Replay and reflection

- Countermeasures against replay and reflection attacks include
  - **use of sequence numbers**
    - generally impractical
  - **timestamps**
    - needs synchronized clocks
  - **challenge/response**
    - using unique nonce, salt, realm values

Eavesdropping and server database reading

- Protection against server database reading:
  - **vulnerable to eavesdropping**

- Protection against eavesdropping:
  - **vulnerable to database reading, and to offline password guessing if the secret (key) is derived from a passwd**



- Protection against both using asymmetric cryptography:



Authentication with shared secret



- drawbacks:
  - **authentication is not mutual**
  - **an eavesdropper could mount an off-line password guessing attack**
  - **some who read the Bob's passwd-database can later inpersonate Alice**

Authentication with shared secret (variant 1)



- differences:
  - **requires reversible cryptography**
  - **if R is a recognizable quantity, Carol can mount an offline passwd-guessing attack without eavesdropping**
  - **if R is a recognizable quantity with limited lifetime (e.g. a random number concatenated with a timestamp), Alice can authenticate Bob**

Authentication with shared secret (variant 2)



- differences:
  - **this mechanism can be added very easily to a protocol designed for cleartext passwd sending**
  - **more efficent**
  - **several pitfalls due to the time validity (time synchronization between Alice and Bob, authentication with multiple server with the same passwd, etc)**
- variant:



Authentication with private/public key



or



- property:
  - **the database at Bob is no-longer security-sensitive (must be protected for unauthorized modification, but not from reading)**
- drawback:
  - **if you can trick Alice into signing something, you can impersonate Alice**
- contromisure:
  - **general rule, not use the same key for two different purpose unless the design for all uses are coordinated**
  - **e.g. impose enough structure to be signed (nounce, realm, timestamp, etc.)**

Mutual authentication with shared secret

- or shorter..



Mutual authentication with shared secret

or shorter..



- but:
  - **Reflection attack**



Good general principle of security protocol:
the initiator should be the first to prove its identity

Mutual authentication with public key

- issues:
  - **how obtaining public key of the peer-entity**
  - **how storing public key of the peer-entity**
  - **how storing own private key**

One-time passwords

- Static passwords
  - **il "supplicant" e l'"authenticator" sono sicronizzati su una password che non cambia nel tempo**

- One-time passwords
  - **Password generate algoritmicamente ognuna delle quali sarà utilizzabile una sola volta**
    - S-Key (rfc1760)
  - **Smart/token Cards**
    - Applicazioni hardware di sistemi one time password

SKey

- **Sistema per la generazione di password dinamiche**
- **Al login, all'utente viene inviato un seme per la generazione della password**
- **L'utente esegue localmente (es. sul suo host) la generazione della password (in funzione del seme inviato) e la comunica al server**
- **Il server confronta quanto ricevuto con la propria password e, se vi è coincidenza, autentifica l'utente**
- **La cattura della password non permette successivi accessi**

SKey



Nota: il valore 'salt' permette di riusare la stessa chiave/passwd su sistemi differenti

Esempio SKey

```
>telnet 193.205.102.131
Trying 193.205.102.131 ...
Connected to 193.205.102.131.
Escape character is '^]'.
Servizio TELNET - Firewall
.........................
Inizio sessione:
CheckPoint FireWall-1 authenticated Telnet server
Login: user_DTCB
SKEY CHALLENGE: 98 user_DTCB
Enter SKEY string: GIST ADA OILY TUNA FRAY RENT
User user_DTCB authenticated by S/Key system.
```